There is a moral hazard when it comes to the bailout of depositors of SIVB. The hazard doesn't lie with bondholders, shareholders, or management. The first two are looking at zero values of their assets, while the last party is out of a job.
The implication is that depositors can just put their money anywhere and not worry. This is an issue, but the Fed and the FDIC want the deposit transaction to be an information free transaction, that is, deposits don't need sophisticated depositors.
The Fed is well aware of the moral hazard involved and has made a policy decision concerning depositors.
This workout is unusual in that the assets are Treasuries and easy to price. The FDIC moved quickly and is banking on selling the assets down the road to pay off the liabilities.
After chewing through capital, bond holders money, and allowing for franchise value, it seems that depositors can be made whole without subsidy. Before closing, the HTM marks were 102% of capital, so it appears that capital alone can cover current asset losses. And given time, the maturation of the bonds at par will allow investment at a higher interest rate.
In 2008, banks had many toxic RMBS and CMBS that no one knew how to price. This time it is different.
Last, SIVB should have never been a bank. Banking a client base in one geography, in one industry, in a place where everyone knows each other, where advisors dictate where to place the money, where depositors exhibit herd-like behavior, and where the depositors generate no cash, is simply a bad idea. This top 20 bank in size in the US had a mere 37,000 depositors.