This sort of modelling is useful for a meta, social-psychological understanding of political behavior across broad stretches of time and space. But, the actual discourse of politics in particular places and at particular times is what matters. In other words, we need to take seriously the substance of political speech in places like Hungary and the US as much as the potentially deeper psychological reasons this substance resonates with certain groups of people.
And the fact is, only a small percentage of any national population is ever seriously engaged with political questions at any given time. This is certainly true of the US, wherein the largest single political constituency is the "don't vote at all" demographic.
The challenge of understanding contemporary US politics boils down to understanding: 1. Why positions that were once considered well outside the mainstream of US conservatism (think of the failure of, say, the Pat Buchanan campaign in the 90s) have so rapidly become central platforms within the GOP; and 2. Why the liberal establishment and its main political expression, the Democratic Party, has thus far been so hapless at addressing, and thus cutting off, the root causes of this shift.
Today's US far right has always ( or at least since the defeat of radical reconstruction), repeated timeless conservative tropes about "natural hierarchies"-- in particular, gender and racial/civilizational-- that it claims are being disastrously ignored or wished away by weak, self-deluded liberals. The question is why these appeals seem to be resonating with a meaningful percentage of the population today. The answer is not obvious, not least because most Americans are more likely to find themselves closer to the bottom of some kind of hierarchy (class, status, educational) than at the middle or top. What has happened to America's founding egalitarianism (always limited in practice but radical in potential)? How does a political culture born out of the Enlightenment concepts of natural human equality come to embrace opposite concepts? Wouldn't it have made more sense if these radical egalitarian roots had produced an increasingly deeper democratic political culture (e.g. one that finally cured the founding pathologies of anti-black racism and imperialist exceptionalism) rather than an increasingly authoritarian one (one that has reanimated 19C concepts of race, racial hierarchy, and national chauvinism)?
Or, maybe it's the marginalized and turned-off party of "no voting" (typically made up of the poorest among us, white, black, and brown) that harbors America's original radical democratic spirit, waiting to be mobilized (in which case, over to you, party of affluent liberals).
Maybe this authoritarian turn represents merely the last political gasp of an exhausted, desperate, and disappearing minority of people (mainly white patriarchs, actual and would-be) who mistake the toppling of the racial and gender hierarchies from which they used to benefit for the decline of American society writ large.
In any case, this isn't something that can be understood simply by recourse to abstract social-psychological typologies, as interesting as they might be in other respects.
